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INTRODUCTION: A NEOLIBERAL BIAS IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE? 
 
The European Union (EU) has often been accused of displaying a neoliberal bias. This 
accusation has been the subject of a vivid academic debate. Initially, this debate mostly 
revolved around the alleged balanced or asymmetric nature of the European integration 
process, with a focus on the original absence of positive integration at the European 
level
1
. Later, with the progressive evolution of European integration and the initiation of 
a new phase of positive integration, the original debate evolved. Indeed, the new phase 
of positive European integration has been quite controversial due to the highly political 
nature of the new policies. As a result, the initiation of positive integration has given 
rise to a new academic debate on the existence of a neoliberal bias in the European 
integration process. This debate does not longer focus on the extent to which the process 
of European integration can be viewed as balanced or asymmetric, but focuses on the 
substantive ideological orientation and content of European positive integration. In this 
regard, whereas some scholars claim that European policies generally display a 
neoliberal bias
2
, others believe that the approach followed by these policies has been 
relatively balanced
3
.  
 
The new debate on the neoliberal bias of European integration has primarily focused on 
European policies within the framework of European economic governance. This is a 
very broad debate that has been approached from different perspectives. In this sense, 
some scholars have examined the development and formulation of these policies. For 
that purpose, many of them have paid attention to the political context and ideational 
background surrounding the formulation of these policies, as well as to the ideological 
                                                          
1
 For the side in this first debate talking about an asymmetric process of European integration, see for 
instance the following scholars: Streeck 1995; McNamara 1998; Gill 2001; Scharpf 2002; Cafruny & 
Ryner 2003; Ferrera 2005; Moss 2005; Preece 2009; McCann 2010; Fitoussi & Saraceno 2013. For the 
side arguing in favour of a relatively balanced process of European integration, see for instance these 
other scholars: Weiss 1992; Ross 1994; Leibfried & Pierson 1995; Falkner 1998; Hantrais 2000.  
2
 See for instance: Raveaud 2007; Preece 2009; Pochet 2010b; Van Apeldoorn & Hager 2010; Hansen & 
Triantafillou 2011; Pochet & Degryse 2012; Degryse et al. 2014; Copeland & Daly 2015; Crespy & Menz 
2015; de la Porte & Heins 2015; Maricut & Puetter 2017. 
3
 See for instance: Borrás & Jacobsson 2004; Ferrera 2005; Bekker 2015; Jessoula 2015; Gómez Urquijo 
2017; Verdun & Zeitlin 2017; Zeitlin & Vanhercke 2017; Bekker 2018. 
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orientation and content of EU strategies and guidelines
4
. At the same time, other 
scholars have focused on the process of implementation of EU policies within the 
framework of European economic governance. Indeed, many scholars believe that, 
based on the intricacies of its practical operation, the process of implementation of these 
EU policies can have a considerable influence on the final policy outcome of European 
economic governance, even altering the balance built on the formulation of these 
policies
5
. For that reason, many scholars have looked at the mechanisms and structural 
conditions surrounding the process of implementation with the aim of analysing the 
effect of this process on the final ideological orientation of EU policies
6
.  
 
This thesis aims to build on the existing debate on the neoliberal bias of EU policies 
within the framework of European economic governance by focusing on the process of 
implementation of these policies. Its aim is to contribute to the existing debate by 
bringing new evidence and addressing under-researched elements. Indeed, several 
scholars have already analysed the process of implementation of these EU policies from 
different perspectives. However, there are still considerable gaps in this debate. On the 
one hand, this debate has largely overlooked the role played by the European 
Commission in the process of implementation. This is an element that requires further 
attention because, as will be explained later, the role played by the European 
Commission in managing the implementation of these EU policies is one of high 
political importance. Moreover, this debate has suffered from a considerable empirical 
deficit, in particular from a lack of qualitative and contextualised in-depth studies of the 
process of implementation of these EU policies in specific member states
7
. This is a 
deficit that needs to be addressed because, as will be seen later, it is mostly in the 
                                                          
4
 See: Borrás & Jacobsson 2004; Raveaud 2007; Preece 2009; Pochet 2010b; Van Apeldoorn & Hager 
2010; Hansen & Triantafillou 2011; Pochet & Degryse 2012; Bekker 2018.  
5
 Deganis 2007; Bauer & Becker 2014; Crespy & Menz 2015; Mattocks 2018. 
6
 See: Deganis 2007; Bauer & Becker 2014; Degryse et al. 2014; Bekker 2015; Copeland & Daly 2015; 
Crespy & Menz 2015; de la Porte & Heins 2015; Jessoula 2015; Eihmans 2017; Gómez Urquijo 2017; 
Maricut & Puetter 2017; Zeitlin & Vanhercke 2017; Mattocks 2018. 
7
 Several scholars have conducted large-N studies on the impact of the process of implementation of 
European economic governance on the ideological orientation of these EU policies (see for instance 
Clauwaert 2013; Bekker 2015; Copeland & Daly 2015; Bekker 2018), but there is a lack of qualitative 
and contextualised in-depth studies on the practical functioning of this process in specific member states.  
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adaptation of these EU policies to specific national contexts that the process of 
implementation can become biased. 
 
With the aim of addressing the previous elements, this thesis conducts a study of the 
role of the European Commission in managing the implementation of EU policies 
within the framework of European economic governance. To do so, this thesis analyses 
the so-called Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs), a set of policy 
recommendations issued by the European Commission to member states within the 
process of implementation of these EU policies. CSRs are highly political elements and 
the main instrument in the hands of the Commission to steer policy implementation. As 
a result, the analysis of these policy instruments appears as the best option for 
examining the role played by the European Commission in the implementation of 
European economic governance. In this regard, the goal is to find patterns in the 
ideological orientation of CSRs issued by the European Commission that could reveal 
the existence of a neoliberal bias in the implementation of these EU policies.  
 
In order to allow for a qualitative and contextualised in-depth analysis of the process of 
implementation, this thesis conducts a single case study that focuses on employment 
policy-related CSRs issued to Spain during the period 2005-2014. There are many 
reasons why this specific case is ideally suited to analyse the possible existence of a 
neoliberal bias in the implementation of EU policies by the European Commission. 
Employment policy is one of the most developed processes of EU policy coordination, 
and it has been central to all EU strategies within the framework of European economic 
governance. Within the field of employment, and for reasons that will be explained 
later, this thesis particularly pays attention to those elements related to the policy model 
of flexicurity. On the other hand, Spain is a member state that has not been investigated 
yet within the framework of European economic governance, and whose labour market 
presents special characteristics that make it a suitable case of study for the identification 
of a possible ideological bias in EU policies. Finally, the choice of the period 2005-
2014 allows for the analysis of a long time-span, thus enabling this thesis to collect 
sufficient and reliable evidence for its analysis. This period also covers different 
economic phases and governments in Spain, therefore allowing this thesis to investigate 
whether European Commission’s policy recommendations are influenced by the 
economic context or the political affiliation of national governments.  
5 
 
 
All the previous bring this thesis to the following research question: to what extent 
has the European Commission displayed a preference towards neoliberal policies in the 
Country Specific Recommendations issued to Spain in the area of employment policy 
during the years 2005-2014? In order to answer this research question, this thesis carries 
out a qualitative content analysis of EU official documents containing CSRs as issued 
by the European Commission. This qualitative content analysis is guided by the use of 
specific categories that aim to facilitate the classification of the policy measures 
contained in CSRs according to their ideological orientation. This methodology, that 
will be described later, is based on Wolfgang Streeck’s analytical framework and its 
distinction between market-making and market-correcting policy measures
8
. The 
examination of national reform programmes presented by Spain in the field of 
employment policy allows this thesis to take into account national realities and 
contextualise the analysis of the ideological orientation of European Commission’s 
policy recommendations.   
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. The following section examines the process of 
implementation of European economic governance and the role of the European 
Commission in the management of this process, showing the impact that the process of 
implementation can have on the final policy outcome and ideological orientation of 
these EU policies. The next section presents the research design of this thesis, offering a 
detailed motivation of the reasons why the selected case of study is suitable for the 
analysis conducted in this thesis. After that, the fourth section of this thesis explains the 
methodology that will be followed in the analysis of the implementation of European 
economic governance. The analysis is then structured in three sub-sections that study 
specific periods of implementation of EU employment policy. These sections start by 
offering an economic, labour market and policy context for the period, and raise some 
expectations for a balanced orientation of CSRs during the period. This is followed by 
the examination of the ideological orientation of the relevant CSRs and a preliminary 
conclusion for each sub-period. The findings of the analysis are then presented in a final 
section, together with some conclusions that aim to contribute to the debate on the 
neoliberal bias of European economic governance.   
                                                          
8
 Streeck 1995 
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
 
The initiation of a new phase of positive integration at the European level has given rise 
to a new academic debate on the existence of a neoliberal bias in the European 
integration process. This debate has mostly focused on the ideological orientation of EU 
policies within the framework of European economic governance. In this regard, some 
scholars have decided to study the process of implementation of these EU policies. 
Indeed, these scholars argue that, based on the intricacies of its practical operation, the 
implementation of these EU policies can have a considerable influence on the final 
policy outcome of European economic governance
9
. This can result in EU policies 
displaying a bias towards certain ideologies and policy measures. In order to understand 
the importance of the process of implementation in the final content and ideological 
orientation of European economic governance, it is necessary to look more in depth at 
the functioning of this process and the role played by the actors involved in it.  
 
Unlike other EU policies, European economic governance is not based on hard-law and 
binding mechanisms Instead, European economic governance relies on the so-called 
Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), an intergovernmental policy-making method 
characterised by its non-binding and voluntary nature through which member states try 
to coordinate their national policies towards commonly agreed objectives. In theory, the 
OMC does not aim to define or prescribe specific policy measures, and it is the member 
states that remain the ultimate responsible for the choice of the necessary means to 
attain the commonly defined objectives. But in order to make member states converge 
towards common objectives, the implementation of European economic governance 
relies on a complex process through which abstract policy goals are translated into 
specific policy measures
10
. It is this complex process that can exert a considerable 
influence on the policy outcome of European economic governance 
 
                                                          
9
 Deganis 2007; Bauer & Becker 2014; Crespy & Menz 2015; Mattocks 2018. 
10
 Bekker 2015. 
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The implementation of European economic governance is a process that starts with 
member states designing national reform programmes that outline a plan to attain the 
commonly defined objectives. These reform programmes then undergo a peer-reviewed 
process of evaluation. In theory, this process should take place automatically against the 
backdrop of previously defined objectives and guidelines, but in practice it requires the 
definition of priorities, indicators, benchmarks and best practices, the analysis and 
interpretation of policy plans, and the delivery of policy recommendations. This means 
that the implementation of EU policies within the framework of European economic 
governance is not an automatic transposition of EU objectives into national policies, but 
is in reality a process that offers some room for discretion
11
. This is even more the case 
if we take into account that, due to the soft-law and coordination nature of the process, 
the implementation of EU policies relies on an adaptation of common EU goals to 
specific national contexts. This adaptation cannot be completely neutral and objective, 
as it is a process that necessarily requires an interpretative exercise. As a consequence, 
the implementation of EU policies, which was supposed to be a merely technical 
process, becomes a rather political task, and one that can have a considerable influence 
on the final ideological orientation of these policies.   
 
The importance of the political nature of the process of implementation of EU policies 
lies on the considerable room for discretion that it offers to the actors involved in this 
process. This creates a window of opportunity that can be used by these actors to steer 
the process and influence its policy outcomes. In this regard, some scholars have 
highlighted the need to examine the key role that the European Commission plays in the 
process of implementation of European economic governance
12
. Within the OMC the 
European Commission has lost its traditional agenda-setting and initiative powers in 
favour of intergovernmental institutions, been its role formally limited to that of policy 
coordination and management of the process of implementation of these EU policies. 
This has led some scholars to argue that, within the OMC, the European Commission 
has been devoid of substantive powers
13
. As a result, academic debates have generally 
overlooked the role of the European Commission in European economic governance
14
. 
                                                          
11
 Deganis 2007; Bauer & Becker 2014; Crespy & Menz 2015; Zeitlin & Vanhercke 2017; Mattocks 2018 
12
 Deganis 2007; Bauer & Becker 2014; Crespy & Menz 2015; Mattocks 2018 
13
 Laffan 1997; Kassim et al. 2013; Bickerton et al. 2015 
14
 Deganis 2007; Mattocks 2018 
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However, there are other scholars who profoundly disagree with the previous assertion. 
In their view, the fact that in the OMC the European Commission does not enjoy a 
formal right of initiative does not mean that its role less important, but just that it 
presents a different nature
15
. Indeed, and although it has been claimed that this is a 
predominantly administrative and technical position, these scholars consider that the 
nature of this process makes managing the implementation of EU policies a task of high 
political importance
16
.  
 
In order to comprehend the highly important role played by the European Commission 
in managing the implementation of European economic governance, it is necessary to 
look again at the practical operation of this process. In this regard, it is important to 
consider one of the main elements in this process of implementation: the so-called 
Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs). Despite the non-binding nature of these 
policy recommendations, member states have committed themselves to following CSRs 
and incorporating them in their future reform plans. The commitment of member states 
to implement CSRs has turned these theoretically voluntary recommendations into 
almost enforceable instruments that can have a considerable direct influence in national 
policy developments
17
.  
 
The considerable impact that CSRs can have on national policy developments would in 
principle not have to influence the relationship established between economic and social 
objectives in European economic governance. Indeed, as in theory these 
recommendations are issued against the backdrop of EU objectives and guidelines, they 
would just aim to implement the balance built on the formulation of EU policies. 
However, as argued before, the definition of policy proposals is not just a technical 
process, but one that offers significant room for discretion. This is because CSRs 
require the adaptation of common EU goals to specific national contexts. This highly 
political exercise has provided the actors involved in the implementation of EU policies 
with an important window of opportunity
18
. It is for this reason that the European 
                                                          
15
 Borrás & Jacobsson 2004; Deganis 2007; Preece 2009; Bauer & Becker 2014; Crespy & Menz 2015; 
Mattocks 2018 
16
 Deganis 2007; Bauer & Becker 2014; Crespy & Menz 2015; Mattocks 2018 
17
 Degryse et al. 2014; Bekker 2015; Crespy & Menz 2015; de la Porte & Heins 2015 
18
 Deganis 2007; Bauer & Becker 2014; Crespy & Menz 2015; Zeitlin & Vanhercke 2017; Mattocks 2018 
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Commission, as the institution in charge of issuing the proposal for these policy 
recommendations, has become a key actor with a considerable ability to steer the 
implementation of European economic governance and influence its final policy 
outcomes
19
.  
 
Of course, the influence of the European Commission on the implementation of 
European economic governance should not be overstated. This is the case because the 
discretion that the European Commission enjoys in this process is only limited, as it has 
to operate in the general direction set by EU strategies and guidelines
20
. Moreover, the 
policy recommendations that the European Commission issues are only proposals. 
These then need to be endorsed by the European Council, which can amend these 
proposals. Nevertheless, and even if the European Commission is expected to follow the 
direction established in the formulation of EU policies, it can still decide to make more 
emphasis on some elements than on others in its policy recommendations. On top of 
that, the progressive strengthening of its coordination and monitoring competences has 
increased the importance of European Commission’s proposals for policy 
recommendations
21
. As a result, the final adoption of CSRs by the European Council 
tends to be a ‘mere stamp of approval’ of the proposals issued by the Commission22. 
Therefore, it can be said that in practice European Commission’s proposals are 
practically enforceable. 
 
In light of the above, it is undeniable that based on its position in the process of 
implementation of European economic governance, the European Commission enjoys 
some room for manoeuvre and can exert a considerable influence on the final outcome 
of EU policies. As a result, the role of the European Commission in the implementation 
of European economic governance through the issuing of CSRs is a factor that needs to 
be taken into consideration when analysing the ideological orientation of these EU 
policies. But which political agenda has the European Commission been advocating in 
its policy recommendations? This is a point on which scholars have profoundly 
                                                          
19
 Degryse et al. 2014; Copeland & Daly 2015; Crespy & Menz 2015 
20
 Deganis 2007; Bauer & Becker 2014 
21
 Zeitlin 2008; Bauer & Becker 2014; Bekker 2015; Copeland & Daly 2015; Crespy & Menz 2015; 
Eihmans 2017 
22
 Deganis 2007: 25. See also: Bauer & Becker 2014; Maricut & Puetter 2017 
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disagreed
23
, and an issue for which more qualitative and contextualised in-depth 
research is required.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
As explained in the previous chapters, this thesis aims to examine the role played by the 
European Commission in the process of implementation of European economic 
governance and its influence on the final ideological orientation of these EU policies. 
For that purpose, this thesis conducts an in-depth empirical research on the practical 
operation of this process. In this sense, and given that its focus is on the role played by 
the European Commission, this thesis focuses its analysis on one of the key elements of 
the process of implementation under the control of the European Commission: the so-
called Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs). 
 
This choice can be motivated as follows. First, and despite their non-binding nature, 
member states have committed themselves to following the policy recommendations 
contained in CSRs. This has turned CSRs into almost enforceable elements which can 
exert a large impact on national policy developments
24
. Moreover, as explained in the 
previous chapter, CSRs are the key instrument guiding the adaptation of common EU 
goals to specific national contexts in this process of policy coordination. This is a highly 
political exercise, being the European Commission the institution in charge of issuing 
the proposals of these policy recommendations. All the previous has turned CSRs into 
key instruments in the hands of the European Commission to steer policy 
implementation and influence the final outcome of European economic governance
25
. 
The availability of primary sources and the possibility of an empirical research also 
make CSRs a highly interesting element of analysis. As a result, the analysis of these 
                                                          
23
 For the side in this debate claiming that the European Commission generally promotes a relatively 
balanced approach in its policy recommendations, see for instance the following scholars: Deganis 2007; 
Bekker 2015; Eihmans 2017; Maricutt & Puetter 2017; Zeitlin & Vanhercke 2017; Bekker 2018. For the 
side in this debate arguing that European Commission’s policy recommendations pursue a neoliberal 
political agenda, see for instance these other scholars: Raveaud 2007; Pochet & Degryse 2012; Degryse et 
al. 2014; Copeland & Daly 2015; Crespy &Menz 2015. 
24
 Degryse et al. 2014; Bekker 2015; Crespy & Menz 2015; de la Porte & Heins 2015 
25
 Degryse et al. 2014; Bekker 2015; Crespy & Menz 2015; de la Porte & Heins 2015 
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policy instruments appears as the best option for the conduction of an empirical analysis 
on the role played by the European Commission in the implementation of European 
economic governance and its influence on the final ideological orientation of these EU 
policies. Given that its focus is on the role played by the European Commission, this 
thesis has opted for the analysis of CSRs as proposed by this institution, and not for the 
examination of the final version of these policy recommendations endorsed by the 
European Council.  
 
The goal of this research is to find patterns in the ideological orientation of CSRs issued 
by the European Commission, and therefore in the orientation of EU policies within the 
framework of European economic governance. There are various reasons why a single 
case study is best suited to do so. First, a single case study allows for a more in-depth 
analysis of the influence of the implementation process on the final outcome of EU 
policies. Second, a single case study makes it possible to put the analysis into its due 
context. Indeed, and in order to assess the orientation of CSRs in an adequate manner, 
their analysis cannot be carried out in a vacuum. On the contrary, this analysis needs to 
be placed in context by taking into account national realities. The need to contextualise 
the analysis is based on the fact that, as instruments that aim to correct the direction of 
existing national policies in light of common EU objectives, CSRs are the key elements 
guiding the adaptation of EU goals to specific national contexts. This means that in 
theory CSRs would only make reference to the points in which member states deviate 
themselves from these objectives. Therefore, making more emphasis on certain policy 
measures than others does not necessarily imply that European Commission’s 
recommendations are biased, but this will depend on which is the reality in the relevant 
member state as well as on its stated reform plans
26
. A single case study is the most 
suitable option to take all the previous into consideration
27
.  
 
                                                          
26
 Muffels & Wilthagen 2013; Bekker 2018 
27
 Indeed, several scholars have acknowledged that member states show different starting points and 
pursue different reform programmes, but they still conduct large-N studies in which national contexts are 
not taken into account. As a result, as stated by Bekker (2018), because CSRs do not contain information 
on national reforms, these studies cannot draw a conclusion on whether CSRs actually present a balanced 
approach adapted to national realities or whether the theoretical balanced approach of CSRs is not such 
when considered in the context of national reform programmes.  
12 
 
The choice of a single case study also allows this thesis to focus on a specific policy 
subject, and therefore to analyse the content and ideological orientation of policy 
recommendations rather than just examining the kind of policy areas covered by these. 
Other scholars have focused their researches on the policy areas that CSRs refer to
28
, 
but this does not say anything about the political orientation of policy recommendations, 
as policy instruments can always be oriented in different ways
29
. Furthermore, by opting 
for a single case study this research can cover the analysis of a long period of time, 
something that would otherwise be beyond the scope of this thesis. As a result, this 
single case study should result in valid and reliable conclusions that may be generalised 
and therefore contribute to the general debate on this topic.   
 
On top of the previous, there are many reasons why the specific case selected in this 
thesis constitutes a suitable and relevant case of study. The choice of employment 
policy is based on the central importance of this policy for the European Social Model 
and European socio-economic strategies
30
. Moreover, employment policy appears as a 
highly political element closely linked to the underlying philosophy of the different 
industrial relations models and welfare systems
31
. This has turned employment policy 
into a key instrument through which member states and European institutions have tried 
to implement different policy models and ideologies
32
. As a result, employment policy 
constitutes a good element for the analysis of the ideological orientation of EU policies 
within the framework of European economic governance. In addition, the EES is one of 
the most developed and solidified processes of EU policy coordination, and one of the 
only in which member states have for a long time been issued policy 
recommendations
33
. This allows this thesis to conduct a significant analysis over a long 
period of time.   
                                                          
28
 As mentioned before, some scholars have tried to assess the ideological orientation of European 
economic governance by focusing on the amount of social policy-related recommendations included in 
CSRs (e.g. Clauwaert 2013; Bekker 2015; Zeitlin & Vanhercke 2017). 
29
 As Bekker (2018) argues, social policy can be used to offer social protection, but also to enhance 
competitiveness and efficiency, and so it depends on the way social policy is defined and the purpose it 
pursues.  
30
 Van Apeldoorn & Hager 2010 
31
 Scharpf 2002; Rhodes 2010 
32
 Rhodes 2010 
33
 Copeland & ter Haar 2013 
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Within the field of employment policy, this thesis has its specific focus on the concept 
of ‘flexicurity’. Flexicurity is a policy strategy that aims to address the challenges of 
modern labour markets by combining high levels of labour-market flexibility and high 
levels of employment security for all types of workers
34
. This policy model has 
progressively gained popularity in the European policy debate, becoming an official EU 
policy strategy in 2005/2006
35
. Since then, flexicurity has been a central concept and 
policy goal in European economic governance
36
. But the policy model of flexicurity has 
received a lot of criticism from different actors. This is because, notwithstanding the 
promise of flexicurity to lead to balanced practices, critics argue that the relationship 
between the principles of flexibility and security is one of incompatibility and based on 
inevitable trade-offs
37
. Moreover, and due to its broad and vague formulation, critics 
argue that flexicurity is a policy concept that can be used in a highly ideological way
38
. 
Therefore, the balance that it theoretically strikes between flexibility and security has to 
be assessed in the final translation of this policy model into concrete policy measures.  
 
All the previous reasons make flexicurity a very suitable focus of analysis for 
examining the existence of a neoliberal bias in the implementation of European 
economic governance and the role played by the European Commission in the 
management of this process. To do so, this thesis will look at the combination of 
flexicurity-related policy measures included in European Commission’s policy 
recommendations. In the European policy context, flexicurity has been formulated as 
the balanced combination of the following four elements: flexible and reliable 
contractual arrangements, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, effective active 
labour market policies, and modern, adequate and sustainable social protection 
systems
39
. This thesis will thus focus its analysis on those policy recommendations that 
make reference to one of these elements, examining their ideological orientation and 
assessing the overall balance between them. This analysis will also pay attention to a 
                                                          
34
 Wilthagen 1998 
35
 Muffels & Wilthagen 2013 
36
 Wilthagen & Tros 2004; Muffels & Wilthagen 2013 
37
 Muffels & Wilthagen 2013 
38
 Wilthagen & Tros 2004; Muffels & Wilthagen 2013; Bekker 2018 
39
 Council of the European Union 2007 
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fifth element: flexible and reliable wage-setting systems. Although not formally part of 
the EU model of flexicurity, this element is often associated to this policy model in EU 
documents and strategies, and many scholars have considered it a component of the 
flexicurity element of flexible and reliable contractual arrangements
40
.  
 
As mentioned before, this thesis focuses its analysis on Spain, and it does so for several 
reasons. First of all, Spain is a large and important EU member state, and one of the 
states that have received most pressure for reform in the last years. However, it is a 
member state that has not been investigated yet within the framework of European 
economic governance. On the other hand, and bearing in mind the importance of taking 
into account national realities, the selection of Spain can be motivated by the 
particularities of the Spanish case. Indeed, Spain is a member state whose labour market 
is characterised, on the one hand, by a high level of regulation
41
, and on the other hand, 
by a generous but stratified system of social protection
42
. Therefore, the Spanish labour 
market presents a big room for improvement in the two dimensions identified in the 
policy model of flexicurity. For the European Commission to promote a balanced policy 
approach in its policy messages, CSRs issued to Spain should include recommendations 
to correct deficiencies in both dimensions rather than just making emphasis on one of 
them. This expectation makes the Spanish labour market an suitable case of study for 
the identification of a possible neoliberal bias within the framework of European 
economic governance.  
 
Finally, there are also good reasons for the selected timeframe of analysis. The choice of 
2005 as the starting point of the analysis can be explained by several reasons. First of 
all, it was only in 2005 that CSRs started to be issued on a systematic basis to guide the 
implementation of EU policies. 2005 also saw a major review of the reporting and 
surveillance process within the framework of European economic governance, and it 
marked the start of a new implementation cycle based on a revision of the Lisbon 
Agenda. It was also in 2005/2006 that flexicurity became an official EU policy strategy. 
Consequently, it makes sense to establish 2005 as the starting point of this analysis. 
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The focus on a ten-year period allows for the examination of a long time-span, thus 
enabling this thesis to collect sufficient and reliable evidence for its analysis. The period 
2005-2014 is also a period that presents especially interesting characteristics. Indeed, 
this is a period in which Spain was ruled by two different political parties with different 
ideologies. From April 2004 until December 2011, Spain was governed by a social-
democratic government under the rule of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). But from 
December 2011 until June 2018, Spain had a Christian-democratic government under 
the rule of the Partido Popular (PP), a party whose ideology is a mix of conservatism 
and economic liberalism. A balanced approach in its policy recommendations would 
require the European Commission to adapt these to the ideological orientation followed 
by the governing party in its policy program. In this sense, the finding of systematically 
unbalanced policy recommendations during a period ruled by different political parties 
could not be justified by the political affiliation of the national government.  
 
The period 2005-2014 also covers two different economic phases in the Spanish 
economy. The analysis of CSRs during two different economic phases in the Spanish 
economy is important because each of these phases requires and allows for different 
policy measures. Indeed, in a phase of economic expansion, governments have more 
room to implement market-correcting policy measures, and they generally have the 
resources to invest in this kind of policies. However, in a moment of economic 
downturn governments are restricted by the economic situation, which requires them to 
concentrate the more limited national resources in boosting the economy. Consequently, 
in periods of economic downturn it is expectable to find a greater emphasis on market-
making policy measures. A balanced approach in its policy recommendations would 
require the European Commission to adapt these to the specific economic situation. As 
a result, the examination of a period that covers different economic phases in the 
Spanish economy implies that a systematically unbalanced policy approach in CSRs 
during this period cannot be justified by the limitations imposed by the economic 
context.   
 
Taking into account all the previous, and bearing in mind the cycles of implementation 
of European economic governance, this thesis has divided and structured the analysis of 
the period 2005-2014 in three sub-periods: 2005-2007, 2008-2011 and 2012-2014. The 
result is a division of the period 2005-2014 that eliminates the potential systematic 
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influence that could be exerted on the ideological orientation of European 
Commission’s policy recommendations by the political affiliation of national 
governments or the limitations imposed by economic context.  
 
Image 1: Temporal division of the analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology followed in this thesis consists in a qualitative research based on the 
analysis of primary sources. More specifically, it examines EU policy documents 
containing Country Specific Recommendations proposed by the European Commission 
to Spain in the area of employment policy during the years 2005-2014. On the basis of 
these primary sources, and with the aim of assessing their ideological orientation, this 
thesis carries out a systematic qualitative content analysis based on a close reading of 
relevant policy recommendations, with a special focus on those aspects related to the 
policy model of flexicurity. Qualitative content analysis is a research method that aims 
to identify underlying ideas and concepts in the content of texts
43
. As such, it appears as 
the most suitable method to assess the ideological orientation of policy 
recommendations. However, qualitative content analysis is not a completely automatic 
and objective task, as in practice it requires an important interpretative work
44
. This 
makes qualitative content analysis open to discretion and subjectivity, what can lead to 
inaccurate findings. In order to overcome this limitation, this thesis systematises the 
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conduction of the qualitative content analysis of CSRs by using pre-established 
frameworks and coding categories
45
.  
 
First, this thesis follows a specific interpretative framework for the analysis and coding 
of CSRs. Scholars have used different frameworks and categories when analysing the 
content and ideological orientation of EU social policy, and there is no academic 
consensus on which is the most appropriate one. However, many of the categories used 
by scholars are based on concepts that result either too vague or not comprehensive 
enough to examine all different policy measures that can be contained in CSRs. 
Following the methodology used by some important scholars in the field
46
, this thesis 
has opted for using the analytical framework developed by Wolfgang Streeck 
differentiating between market-making and market-correcting social policy measures
47
. 
According to Streeck, market-making measures are all those policy measures that 
involve some sort of reform to deregulate the economy with the aim of removing the 
barriers that hinder market competition and economic efficiency
48
. Market-correcting 
measures are by contrast all those policy measures that call for public engagement with 
the aim of correcting negative market outcomes in the name of equality, compensation 
or social inclusion, and that many times result in distorting market mechanisms
49
.  
 
In addition to offering a precise and comprehensive categorisation of social policy 
measures, the interpretative framework developed by Wolfgang Streeck has the 
advantage of having been designed in the context of EU social policy
50
. As such, this 
framework perfectly suits the analysis that this thesis aims to conduct. Thus, this thesis 
uses the qualitative content analysis of CSRs to classify European Commission’s 
flexicurity-related policy recommendations into either market-making or market-
correcting policy measures. However, and even if the use of the framework developed 
by Wolfgang Streeck offers very useful guidance in assessing the orientation of 
flexicurity-related CSRs, these categories can sometimes be too vague when analysing 
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specific policy measures, thus still leaving the analysis open to interpretation. For this 
reason, and with the purpose of structuring and systematising as much as possible its 
analysis, this thesis further develops this interpretative framework by pre-establishing a 
classification of the main components and policy measures linked to the policy model of 
flexicurity into one of the categories contemplated in this framework.  
 
Classifying policy measures into the market-making or market-correcting category is 
not an evident and totally objective exercise. This is because not all scholars agree on 
which policy measures can be considered market-making and which ones should be 
classified as market-correcting. Nevertheless, it is still possible to find a relative 
academic consensus on which flexicurity-related policy measures pertain to each of 
these categories. A review of the existing literature on this field has allowed this thesis 
to pre-establish a general classification of the main components and policy measures 
related to the model of flexicurity into the market-making or market-correcting 
category. The resulting classification is used in this thesis to guide the qualitative 
content analysis of CSRs:  
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Table 1: Classification of flexicurity-related policy measures following Streeck’s framework 
FLEXICURITY-RELATED MARKET-MAKING POLICY 
MEASURES 
FLEXICURITY-RELATED MARKET-CORRECTING 
POLICY MEASURES  
Measures promoting flexible contractual arrangements: 
 
 Facilitation of individual and collective dismissal procedures 
(notice, procedure, legal grounds, etc.). 
 Reduction of mandated severance payments. 
 Reduction of hiring requirements and obligations. 
 Facilitation of the conditions for using fixed-term contracts 
(maximum duration, number of contract renewals, etc.). 
 Promotion of the use of fixed-term and part-time employment. 
 Liberalisation of the market of Temporary Work Agencies. 
 Promotion of internal flexibility within companies (working-
time flexibility, functional flexibility, geographical mobility, 
etc.). 
 Promotion of flexible wage-setting systems (decentralisation of 
wage-setting arrangements, liberalisation of wage indexation, 
linkage of nominal wage developments to the evolution of 
Measures promoting reliable contractual arrangements:  
 
 Reinforcement of individual and collective dismissal procedures 
(notice, procedure, legal grounds, etc.).  
 Increase of mandated severance payments.  
 Introduction of hiring requirements and obligations. 
 Limitation of the possibilities of using fixed-term contracts 
(maximum duration, number of contract renewals, etc.). 
 Promotion of permanent employment. 
 Stricter regulation of the market of Temporary Work Agencies.  
 Reinforcement of the rules regulating working conditions and 
employment safety, especially for non-standard contracts. 
 Promotion of reliable wage-setting systems (establishment of 
minimum wages, use of wage indexation, enhancement of 
collective wage bargaining, etc.). 
 Enhancement of combination security (reconciliation of private and 
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productivity, etc.). professional life). 
 Special protection and support for disadvantaged groups. 
Measures promoting effective active labour market policies: 
 
 Reduction of the tax wedge on labour. 
 Promotion of employment-friendly labour costs. 
 Limitation of the possibilities of early retirement. 
 
Measures promoting effective active labour market policies:  
 
 Improvement of public employment search and advice services. 
 Greater investment in employment subsidies for companies to 
create jobs for the unemployed and inactive. 
 Facilitation of the reconciliation of private and professional life.  
 Promotion of active ageing through the use of incentives. 
 Fostering of the geographical mobility of workers to regions with 
higher labour demand.  
 Promotion of self-employment among the unemployed. 
 Special promotion of the employment of disadvantaged groups. 
  Measures promoting comprehensive lifelong learning strategies:  
 
 Investment in (re)training and learning programmes for the 
unemployed. 
 Use of incentives for companies to invest in training 
programmes for employees. 
 Introduction of leave schemes for training and education. 
 Improve the quality of education and training systems. 
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 Increase the labour-market relevance of education and 
training. 
 Promote vocational guidance. 
 Increase educational attainment levels. 
 Reduce early school exit. 
 Make education and training affordable, accessible, attractive 
and flexible.  
 Special protection and support for disadvantaged groups.  
Measures promoting sustainable social protection systems: 
 
 Rationalisation of the amount and/or the duration of 
unemployment benefits. 
 Restriction of the access to social rights and benefits to people 
in employment. 
 Limitation of family-supporting benefits and rights. 
 Increase of the cost-effectiveness of benefits and public 
services. 
Measures promoting modern and adequate social protection systems: 
 
 Increase of the amount and/or duration of unemployment benefits. 
 Provision of universal access to social rights throughout the life 
cycle. 
 Improvement of healthcare provision and pension entitlements.  
 Investment in family-supporting benefits and rights. 
 Special protection of disadvantaged groups.  
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Given that CSRs many times include very concise and vague policy messages, and that 
they often make reference to policy goals rather than to specific policy measures, the 
interpretation of these policy recommendations is assisted by the examination of the 
guidelines for the employment policies of member states approved by the Council for 
every policy coordination cycle and followed by the European Commission in the 
implementation of this EU policy. Finally, and in order to put the analysis of the 
orientation of CSRs into its due context, this research takes into account national 
realities. For this purpose, this thesis examines reform programmes presented by Spain 
within the framework of European economic governance during the period 2005-2014. 
These primary sources contain a diagnosis of the labour market and employment 
situation in Spain, and they also state Spain’s intended reforms to correct existing 
deficiencies and challenges in this area. As such, the assessment of national reform 
programmes appears as the most suitable option to contextualise the analysis of the 
orientation of CSRs. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
2005-2007 IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD 
 
1) General context: 
 
 Economic context: 
 
The period 2005-2007 covers the first cycle of implementation of the renewed Lisbon 
Agenda. It was a period characterised by a phase of strong expansion of the Spanish 
economy, an expansion that resulted in a dynamic labour market with a high rate of job 
creation and a considerable reduction of the unemployment rate. During this period, 
Spain also presented a strong financial position based on its sound public accounts. 
However, the expansion of the Spanish economy during this period was based on an 
unbalanced and fragile growth model. Economic growth was mainly driven by a strong 
construction sector, a rising employment rate, an intensive use of labour, and favourable 
monetary and financial conditions, while the levels of productivity remained 
considerably low. This, together with other factors, led to high unit labour costs, high 
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inflation, persistent current account deficits, and high levels of domestic and external 
indebtedness. In any case, it can be said that in this period Spain enjoyed favourable 
economic conditions. 
 
 Labour market and flexicurity performance: 
 
In this period, Spain presented a poor performance in terms of flexicurity. First, the 
Spanish labour market presented low levels of labour flexibility
51
. This was the result of 
various factors. On the one hand, it was a consequence of the existence of strong wage 
indexation mechanisms and a highly centralised collective bargaining system
52
. This 
reduced companies’ possibilities to adapt to changing market conditions by resorting to 
internal flexibility mechanisms such as working times and wages adjustments
53
. 
External flexibility among permanent workers was also very low in Spain, as these were 
protected by a strict employment legislation and high dismissal costs
54
. This contrasted 
with the relatively weak protection given in Spain to temporary employment, both in 
terms of dismissal legislation and costs, and led to a highly segmented labour market
55
. 
As a consequence, the main flexibility option available for Spanish companies was to 
make use of external flexibility in relation to temporary employment
56
. This resulted in 
high levels of temporary employment and a high volatility in employment levels in the 
Spanish labour market
57
.  
 
Second, in this period the Spanish labour market presented relatively low levels of 
employment security. This was the case for various reasons. First, this was a 
consequence of Spain’s labour market segmentation, which resulted in high levels of 
temporary employment subjected to a very weak employment protection
58
. Secondly, 
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this was a result of Spain’s generous but stratified system of social protection59. Indeed, 
in this period Spain presented a very generous welfare state, especially in terms of 
pensions and unemployment benefits
60
. However, these two elements were basically 
limited to contributors, which implied that only a fraction of the Spanish population was 
covered by the social protection system
61
. This was especially problematic in a country 
where some social groups (e.g. women, immigrants) were underrepresented in the 
labour market, and where unemployment was concentrated in specific groups (e.g. 
young people, unskilled long-term unemployed citizens and old workers) whose long-
term unemployment made them exhaust their unemployment benefits or who did not 
even meet the contribution requirements to receive a benefit
62
.  
 
In addition, whereas in this period Spain presented a high investment in passive labour 
market policies, its expenditure in active labour market policies was relatively low
63
. 
This seriously impacted employment security in the Spanish labour market. Spain did 
allocate some resources on permanent hiring incentives to reduce temporary 
employment
64
, but it also needed to use active labour market policies more intensively 
to promote employment among social groups needing special support in joining the 
labour market (e.g. women, unskilled long-term unemployed, young people, old 
workers, etc.)
65
. Moreover, there was a need for Spain to make more efforts to reduce 
the risks associated with employment transitions. Indeed, in this period Spain presented 
an insufficient investment in the training of unemployed people, something especially 
serious given the high level of employment turnover in the Spanish labour market
66
. 
 
The weakness of employment security was also the result of Spain’s low levels of 
human capital
67
. This was a consequence of Spain’s low educational levels, the 
weakness of its vocational training system and the limited participation of employees in 
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permanent training within companies
68
. Low levels of human capital not only 
undermined productivity growth and competitiveness, but also considerably reduced the 
employability of workers, increasing their exposure to the risks associated with 
employment transitions in the labour market
69
. All the previous shows that in this period 
Spain needed to improve its flexicurity performance, both in terms of flexibility and 
security.  
 
 Policy program: 
 
The favourable economic context and its strong financial position in this period offered 
the Spanish government a considerable room to introduce reforms aimed at enhancing 
labour-market flexibility while also correcting existing deficiencies and moving forward 
in terms of employment security. In this way, Spain, which during this period was ruled 
by a social-democratic government, designed a predominantly market-correcting 
employment policy programme in which the public sector was given a key role
70
. On 
the one hand, the reform programme presented by Spain within the framework of 
European economic governance in the period 2005-2007 made a strong emphasis on 
enhancing human capital with the aim of increasing labour productivity and ensuring 
employability. For that purpose, this programme focused on the improvement of the 
education and training systems and on the enhancement of life-long learning 
possibilities for people in work and out of work. In addition, the Spanish reform 
programme sought to attract and retain more people in employment through the use of 
strong active labour market policies and hiring incentives, with a focus on a number of 
priority collectives: women, young workers, older workers, long-term unemployed, 
disabled people and immigrants. The reduction of labour market segmentation was also 
one of the main priorities of this reform programme, which identified important market-
correcting measures to limit temporary employment and promote permanent hiring.  
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 Expectations: 
 
Bearing in mind the previous economic and policy context, it can be expected that a 
balanced approach in European Commission’s policy recommendations to Spain during 
the period 2005-2007 would present a predominantly market-correcting orientation. 
This is the case because the existing deficiencies in the Spanish labour market together 
with the favourable economic context and the strong financial position of Spain during 
this period would require and allow for strong market-oriented policies. In this sense, 
CSRs are expected to address the need to enhance human capital and the employability 
of workers through a greater investment in life-long learning strategies. CSRs are also 
expected to call for a more intensive and market-correcting use of active labour market 
policies with the aim of attracting to employment those social groups in need of special 
support. In addition, it would be expected from the Commission to recommend Spain to 
make use of market-correcting measures to reduce labour market segmentation and 
increase employment security among temporary workers. In any case, taking into 
account the balance pursued by the policy model of flexicurity and the insufficient 
attention paid by the Spanish government in its reform programme to employment 
flexibility, European Commission’s policy recommendations during this period are also 
expected to call for market-making measures aimed at enhancing internal flexibility 
opportunities for Spanish companies.  
 
2) Analysis of Country Specific Recommendations 
 
 2005 Country Specific Recommendations 
 
The assessment made by the European Commission of Spain’s 2005 National Reform 
Program in the area of employment policy contains two recommendations. The first 
recommendation concerns the need to reduce the segmentation of the Spanish labour 
market
71
. The classification of this policy recommendation is not straightforward, as it 
only refers to a policy goal and does not identify specific policy measures, being this a 
goal that can be pursued through different strategies. Nevertheless, the examination of 
the 2005-2007 guidelines for the employment policies of member states shows that, 
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when talking about labour market segmentation, the Council tends to make more 
emphasis on market-making policy measures based on the promotion of flexible 
employment legislation and adaptable forms of work organisation for all different 
contractual arrangements
72
. As the European Commission is expected to follow the 
guidelines set by the Council in the implementation of EU policies, it can therefore be 
deduced that the previous is the kind of policy measures that the European Commission 
is referring to in its recommendation. 
 
The second recommendation makes reference to the need to increase female 
employment
73
. Although the European Commission does not identify specific policy 
measures for the attainment of this goal, it is clear that this policy recommendation 
presents a market-correcting orientation. This is the case because any policy measure 
aimed at increasing female employment will be intended to correct a negative market 
outcome, in this case the under-representation of a social group in the labour market in 
the name of equality and social inclusion, and it will do so even if it represents a 
distortion of market mechanisms. 
 
 2006 Country Specific Recommendations 
 
European Commission’s policy recommendations on Spain’s 2006 implementation 
report focused on three main points. First, the European Commission identified the need 
to modernise employment protection, and issued three recommendations in this regard. 
The first recommendation makes reference to the need to ‘modernise employment 
protection, including legislation, to foster flexibility and security in the labour 
market’74. This is a very broad recommendation that does not identify specific policy 
measures, but rather focuses on two policy goals: the attainment of both flexibility and 
security in the labour market. The examination of the 2005-2007 guidelines for the 
employment policies of member states shows that this is a quite neutral 
recommendation that covers both market-making and market-correcting policy 
measures. The ideological orientation of this policy recommendation would depend on 
the specific combination of policy measures adopted by Spain in response. 
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The second recommendation concerns the need to modernise employment protection to 
counter segmentation
75
. This recommendation is similar to the one received by Spain in 
2005, and again its classification is not straightforward as it only refers to a policy goal 
and does not identify specific policy measures, being this a goal that can be pursued 
through different strategies. Nevertheless, the examination of the 2005-2007 guidelines 
for the employment policies of member states reveals that this policy recommendation 
points to the need of adopting market-making policy measures based on the promotion 
of flexible employment legislation and adaptable forms of work organisation for all 
different contractual arrangements
76
. Therefore, it can be concluded that this is a 
recommendation with a market-making orientation. 
 
The third recommendation identifies the need to modernise employment legislation ‘to 
increase the attractiveness of part-time work’77. As it was the case with the previous 
recommendation, the classification of this recommendation is also not straightforward, 
as it is a quite vague recommendation that only makes reference to a policy goal. 
Nevertheless, the examination of the 2005-2007 guidelines for the employment policies 
of member states shows that, when talking about part-time work, the Council tends to 
make reference to market-making measures that promote modern and adaptable forms 
of work organisation that allow for greater labour market flexibility and better meet the 
needs of companies
78
. As the European Commission is expected to follow the 
guidelines set by the Council for the implementation of EU policies, it can therefore be 
deduced that the previous is the orientation that the European Commission is according 
to its recommendation. 
 
The second point of attention of the 2006 European Commission’s policy 
recommendations relates to the enhancement of human capital. Indeed, the fourth and 
fifth recommendations concern the need to effectively implement education reforms in 
order to reduce early school leaving and to integrate training systems to provide a better 
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response to labour market needs
79
. These two recommendations can be considered to 
pertain to the flexicurity component of comprehensive life-long learning strategies. This 
is because, even if they are also intended to contribute to labour productivity, these two 
recommendations concern market-correcting policy measures aimed at improving the 
employability of both future workers and active people. The same can be said about the 
sixth recommendation on the need to raise skill levels and productivity
80
, which pursues 
to increase productivity but at the same time to contribute to the employability of future 
workers and active people. Independently of the specific policy measures adopted by 
Spain to attain these goals, these will be market-correcting measures aimed at correcting 
existing or potential negative market outcomes: the lack of relevant professional skills 
and/or the mismatch between skills and existing labour market needs.   
 
Finally, European Commission’s 2006 policy recommendations present a third priority 
that relates to the need to attract more people to employment, with a special focus on 
unrepresented social groups. In this sense, the seventh and eighth recommendation 
emphasise the need to integrate immigrants into the labour market and to increase 
access to childcare
81
. These are two recommendations that pertain to the category of 
active labour market policies and that focus on the need to correct existing negative 
market outcomes: the discrimination and/or under-representation of immigrants and 
women in the labour market. Therefore, it is evident that these two are market-
correcting recommendations.   
 
 2007 Country Specific Recommendations 
 
In 2007, the European Commission issued a new set of CSRs for member states on the 
implementation of their 2005 National Reform Programmes. Nevertheless, the 
European Commission considered that, since the first recommendations had only been 
issued recently, and given that implementing structural reforms required perseverance 
and continuity, it would be advisable to ‘maintain the current set of recommendations 
largely unchanged’ and only ‘fine-tune them in the light of progress made since their 
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adoption’82. As a result, in 2007 the European Commission proposed a set of CSRs that 
were very similar to the ones issued to Spain on its 2006 implementation report
83
. As 
the aim of reiterating the CSRs already proposed to Spain the previous year is to 
reinforce the implementation of these policy recommendations, it can be said that these 
new CSRs pursue the same aims as the ones issued in 2006, and therefore the analysis 
made in the previous section also applies to the CSRs proposed for 2007.  
 
3) Conclusion 
 
The previous analysis shows that, out of the 17 flexicurity-related CSRs issued to Spain 
during the years 2005-2007, 5 presented a market-making orientation and 10 pursued 
market-correcting aims, while other 2 were too broadly defined as to be possible to 
classify them into one of these two categories. The contextualisation of this analysis 
shows that the predominant market-correcting of CSRs during the years 2005-2007 
takes place in an expansionist economic scenario in which Spain had a strong economic 
and fiscal position, position that made it possible for the Spanish government to focus 
on this kind of policy measures. The predominant market-correcting orientation of 
CSRs during this period also takes place against the background of a poor performance 
of the Spanish labour market in terms of employment security, what required the 
adoption of market-correcting measures intended to address the existing deficiencies. 
This helps to explain the greater emphasis made on market-correcting measures, and 
meets the expectations raised for this period.  
 
In any case, and given the low levels of flexibility of the Spanish labour market and the 
insufficient attention paid by the Spanish government in its reform programme to 
employment flexibility, CSRs during the period 2005-2007 also made emphasis on the 
need to reinforce employment flexibility in Spain. However, contrary to the 
expectations raised for the period, CSRs focused on modernising employment 
protection to reduce labour legislation, and did not pay attention to the need of 
increasing internal flexibility for companies. In any case, and bearing in mind the 
                                                          
82
 COM 2007:2 
83
 COM 2017:18 
31 
 
expectations raised for this period, it can be said that flexicurity-related CSRs issued to 
Spain during the years 2005-2007 present a relatively balanced ideological orientation. 
 
2008-2011 IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD 
 
1) General context: 
 
 Economic context: 
 
The period 2008-2011 covers the second cycle of implementation of the renewed 
Lisbon Agenda and the first year of the European Semester. This period was 
characterised by an intense economic downturn and readjustment of the Spanish 
economy. The slowdown of the Spanish economy started at the end of 2007 as a 
consequence of the deceleration of its oversized construction sector. The domestic 
economic downturn coincided with a disadvantageous international economic scenario 
and a global financial crisis that further aggravated the slowdown of the Spanish 
economy. As a result of all the previous, the Spanish economy experienced a sharp 
reduction of domestic demand and economic activity. This also initiated a phase of 
strong readjustment of the macroeconomic imbalances accumulated during the previous 
expansionary phase of the Spanish economy. At first, it was believed that the Spanish 
economy had some room for manoeuvre to face the difficult economic situation by 
pursuing a strong countercyclical fiscal policy. However, the deceleration of the 
Spanish economy was so profound that it resulted in a severe deterioration of Spain’s 
public accounts and a considerable growth of its public debt. This limited the policy 
options available to respond to the serious economic situation.  
 
 Labour market and flexicurity performance: 
 
The profound deceleration and strong readjustment of the Spanish economy had a high 
impact on employment levels. Indeed, this period was characterised by high levels of 
job destruction, levels that were especially high in some economic sectors and among 
certain groups of workers, especially young people, unskilled workers, temporary 
employees and old workers. When it comes to flexicurity, in this period the Spanish 
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labour market continued to be characterised by low levels of employment flexibility. 
This was the result of the strictness of its employment protection regarding the dismissal 
of permanent workers, the existence of a highly centralised collective bargaining system 
and wage indexation mechanisms, and the reduced internal flexibility possibilities for 
companies
84
. Nevertheless, this started to change after the 2010 labour reform 
introduced some flexibility in the Spanish labour market, especially in terms of 
dismissal protection, collective bargaining and internal flexibility within companies
85
.  
 
With regards to employment security, the Spanish labour market continued to be 
characterised by a generous provision of unemployment benefits and a medium level of 
investment in active labour market policies and life-long learning strategies
86
. However, 
put into perspective, the increasing number of long-term unemployed who had 
exhausted their unemployment benefits and the rising number of people exposed to the 
risks associated with unemployment and employment transitions made these levels of 
investment insufficient to ensure employment security in the Spanish labour market. On 
the other hand, and although Spain made improvements in terms of human capital 
thanks to its investments in the educational and training systems, these were still low 
and not sufficient to mitigate the high levels of job destruction. As a result, it can be 
said that Spain’s performance in terms of employment security, which was already 
relatively low, worsened during this period.  
 
 Policy program: 
 
During the first two years of the period, the employment policy followed by the Spanish 
government was essentially a continuation of the previous period of implementation. 
Indeed, in 2008 and 2009 the ruling social-democratic party maintained a predominant 
market-correcting orientation focused on the enhancement of human capital and the 
fight against labour market segmentation. In addition, and in order to address the high 
levels of job destruction, the Spanish government made special emphasis on the use of 
active labour market policies and increased the funds available for unemployment 
benefits.  
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But in 2010 and 2011, the deterioration of its public accounts and the austerity policy 
adopted by Spain limited the possibilities of using market-correcting policies and 
compelled the government to adopt an increasing market-making approach in its 
employment policy. Thus, while trying to maintain the previous market-correcting 
efforts, the Spanish government undertook an important market-making labour reform 
in 2010. The new reform was primarily intended to increase the flexibility of the 
Spanish labour market as a way to address the high levels of job destruction and create 
jobs. For that purpose, the 2010 Spanish labour market reform tried to increase internal 
flexibility within companies and allowed for the suspension of collective agreements for 
companies in difficulties in order to avoid a further destruction of jobs. This market-
making approach was also present in its new efforts to fight labour market 
segmentation, which focused on reducing the high levels of temporary employment in 
Spain by reducing dismissal protection for all types of contractual arrangements.  
 
 Expectations: 
 
Bearing in mind the previous economic and policy context, it can be expected that a 
balanced approach in European Commission’s policy recommendations to Spain during 
the period 2008-2011 would present a balanced combination of market-correcting and 
market-correcting recommendations. First, it can be expected that CSRs will make a 
greater emphasis on market-making measures than in the previous period. This is the 
case because the strong deterioration of Spanish public accounts would limit the 
possibilities of developing market-correcting policies in order to address the high levels 
of job destruction. In this sense, and taking into account the strategy prescribed by the 
policy model of flexicurity, during this period CSRs are expected to focus on increasing 
labour market flexibility as a way to avoid a further destruction of employment and 
create jobs. CSRs can also be expected to address the need to reduce labour market 
segmentation through the recommendation of market-making measures. This should 
especially be the case during the first half of the period, a moment in which the policy 
program designed by the Spanish government still presented a predominantly market-
correcting approach.  
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Nevertheless, the existing high levels of unemployment and the need under the policy 
model of flexicurity to compensate labour flexibility with employment security would 
make it necessary for the Spanish employment policy to maintain strong market-
correcting efforts. Therefore, a balanced approach in European Commission’s policy 
recommendations would be expected to make emphasis on the use of active labour 
market policies, the re-training of workers and the adequate provision of unemployment 
benefits. This should especially be the case in the second half of the period, a moment 
in which the Spanish government adopted a predominantly market-making approach in 
its employment policy.  
 
2) Analysis of Country Specific Recommendations 
 
 2008 Country Specific Recommendations 
 
European Commission’s policy recommendations on Spain’s 2008 implementation 
report focused on two main points. On the one hand, the European Commission made 
emphasis on the need to create jobs by ‘promoting a swift transition into employment’ 
through the elimination of labour market barriers
87
. In order to attain this goal, the 
European Commission issued two policy recommendations. First, the European 
Commission recommended Spain to adopt measures to further encourage mobility
88
. 
The classification of this recommendation is not completely clear-cut, as this is a policy 
goal that can be pursued through different policy measures with different orientations. 
Nevertheless, the examination of the 2008-2010 guidelines for the employment policies 
of member states shows that, when talking about labour mobility, the Council tends to 
make reference to market-making measures that eliminate restrictions on companies to 
make use of geographic mobility possibilities and allow for a greater adaptability of 
enterprises
89
.  
 
Secondly, the European Commission recommended Spain to continue countering 
segmentation in the labour market
90
. This is not a straightforward recommendation, as 
                                                          
87
 COM 2009:24 
88
 COM 2009:24 
89
 See Council 2008, guideline no. 21, p. 52 
90
 COM 2009:24 
35 
 
this is a broad policy goal that can be pursued through various policy measures with 
different orientations. But as it was the case in previous years, and taking into account 
the 2008-2010 guidelines for the employment policies of member states, it can be 
concluded that this policy recommendation refers to the need of adopting market-
making policy measures that allow for more flexible employment legislation and 
adaptable forms of work organisation
91
. 
 
The second focus of attention of European Commission’s 2008 policy recommendations 
in the area of flexicurity relates to the enhancement of human capital. Again, the 
European Commission issued two policy recommendations aimed at attaining this goal. 
Its first recommendation focuses on the need to upgrade skills
92
. This recommendation 
falls under the flexicurity component of comprehensive lifelong learning strategies. 
Indeed, and even if also intended to increase labour productivity, this recommendation 
is predominantly aimed at improving the employability of both workers and 
unemployed people. In its second recommendation, the European Commission 
recommended Spain to ensure the effective implementation of educational reforms 
‘with the main objectives of reducing early school leaving and increasing the graduation 
rate in upper secondary education’93. These predominantly educational measures are 
also intended to enhance the employability of future workers. In both cases, and 
independently of the specific policy measures adopted by Spain to attain these goals, 
these will be market-correcting measures aimed at correcting existing or potential 
negative market outcomes: the lack of relevant professional skills and/or the mismatch 
between skills and existing labour market needs. 
 
 2009 and 2010 Country Specific Recommendations 
 
2009 and 2010 were the only years in which EU member states did not receive country-
specific recommendations since the European Commission started systematically 
issuing these policy recommendations in 2005. These were years of change in the 
European governance architecture due to the exigencies imposed by the economic crisis 
and to the transition to a new framework for policy coordination at the EU level. As a 
                                                          
91
 See Council 2008, guideline no. 21, p. 52 
92
 COM 2009:24 
93
 COM 2009:24 
36 
 
result, the process of socio-economic policy coordination was set in standby until the 
beginning of the European Semester in 2011. This makes it impossible to include an 
analysis of the ideological orientation of these EU policies during these two years.  
 
 2011 Country Specific Recommendations 
 
In 2011, European Commission’s policy recommendations made emphasis on three 
main elements. First, the European Commission focused on the need to introduce more 
flexibility in the Spanish labour market as a way to avoid a further destruction of 
employment and create new jobs. In this sense, the European Commission issued two 
recommendations. Firstly, the European Commission recommended Spain reform its 
collective wage bargaining process and wage indexation system in order to link wage 
growth to productivity developments, local conditions and firm level circumstances
94
. 
The idea behind this recommendation was to eliminate the barriers that impeded wage 
flexibility and prevented companies from adjusting to changing market conditions. 
Therefore, this recommendation presents a clear market-making orientation advocating 
for market solutions as a way to prevent companies from resorting to the destruction of 
employment and create jobs.  
 
The second recommendation made by the European Commission with the aim of 
increasing labour-market flexibility relates to the need of assessing the impacts of the 
2010 labour market reform, with a special focus on the reduction of labour market 
segmentation
95
. As noted before, the 2010 labour market reform represented a change of 
approach in Spain’s employment policy as it opted for promoting internal and external 
flexibility for companies as a way to address the high levels of job destruction and 
create jobs. Consequently, a recommendation to evaluate the impacts of this reform is 
aimed at assessing whether the implementation of the reform has actually allowed for 
greater internal and external flexibility for companies, advising Spain to effectively 
implement the necessary measures to attain these goals. In the case of labour market 
segmentation, the approach followed by the 2010 labour market reform focused on 
reducing the high levels of temporary employment in Spain by reducing dismissal 
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protection for all types of contractual arrangements. It is clear then that this is a market-
making oriented recommendation intended to eliminate the barriers that hinder the 
functioning of market mechanisms in the Spanish labour market.  
 
The second point of attention of the European Commission in its 2011 policy 
recommendations to Spain focuses on the use of active labour market policies. More 
specifically, the European Commission recommended Spain to assess the impacts of the 
2011 reform of active labour market policies, with a special focus on ‘employment 
opportunities for young people’96. This reform was conceived as a strengthened strategy 
to correct the profound effect of the economic crisis on the labour market in terms of 
unemployment. Consequently, a recommendation to evaluate the impacts of this reform 
is aimed at assessing whether the implementation of the reform has been translated into 
an improved assistance to unemployed people in terms of employability, job search and 
hiring incentives. The specific mention of young people, a social group especially 
affected by unemployment, makes it more evident that this is a recommendation 
intended to improve Spain’s market-correcting efforts in its labour market through the 
use of enhanced active labour market policies. 
 
The final recommendation issued to Spain in 2011 relates to the enhancement of human 
capital. More specifically, the European Commission recommended Spain to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the measures implemented with the aim of reducing early school 
leaving and facilitating ‘the transition to vocational education and training’97. As noted 
in previous occasions, these educational measures can be included in the flexicurity 
component of comprehensive life-long learning strategies, and they are aimed at 
enhancing the employability of future workers. In this sense, this recommendation is 
intended to improve the efforts made by Spain in order to correct existing and potential 
deficiencies in its labour market, namely, the lack of relevant professional skills and the 
mismatch between skills and existing labour market needs. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that this is a recommendation with a market-correcting orientation. 
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3) Conclusion  
 
The previous analysis shows that, out of the 8 flexicurity-related recommendations 
issued to Spain during the years 2008-2011, 4 presented a market-making orientation 
and 4 pursued market-correcting aims. In principle, the apparent balanced approach of 
country-specific recommendations would meet the expectation raised for this period. 
However, an analysis of the content of these policy recommendations reveals the 
predominance of a market-making orientation in the policy approach followed by the 
European Commission in the period 2008-2011. The predominance of a market-making 
orientation results from the more far-reaching nature and deeper impact of the market-
making recommendations issued by the Commission during this period, whereas 
market-correcting recommendations are rather conceived as supporting measures 
complementing the structural reform of the labour market.  
 
The contextualisation of this analysis shows that the predominant market-making 
orientation of European Commission’s recommendations takes place against the 
background of a deep economic deceleration coupled with high levels of job destruction 
and a strong deterioration of public finances. This helps to explain the greater emphasis 
on market-making measures during this period. The low levels of labour market 
flexibility and the initial continuation of a predominantly market-correcting orientation 
in Spain’s employment policy also allows to understand the European Commission’s 
focus on market-making measures during this period. However, and even if European 
Commission’s recommendations in this period also include a number of market-
correcting measures, the high levels of job destruction and unemployment and the 
consequent deterioration of employment security levels would have required a greater 
emphasis on substantial market-correcting measures, especially in terms of hiring 
incentives, the re-training of unemployed people and the adequate provision of 
unemployment benefits. As a result, it can be concluded that, even if not totally biased, 
the orientation of policy recommendations during this period presents a certain bias 
towards market-making measures.  
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2012-2014 IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD 
 
1) General context:  
 
 Economic context: 
 
The period 2012-2014 covers the first years of the new European Semester and the 
central years of implementation of the 2010-2014 guidelines for the employment 
policies of member states. This period coincided with an unfavourable international 
environment marked by the deceleration of the international economy, a high financial 
instability and a profound debt crisis in the Eurozone. The adverse international context 
had an especially negative impact on the Spanish economy, which in this period 
presented a continuation and deepening of the economic deceleration initiated in 2008. 
In turn, this domestic economic downturn led to a process of strong adjustment of the 
macroeconomic imbalances accumulated during the previous expansionary phase of the 
Spanish economy. This was coupled with a profound deterioration of public finances 
and a rapid growth of public debt, which was the result of the activation of 
countercyclical fiscal policies and the recapitalisation of the Spanish banking system. In 
order to correct its increasing budgetary deficit, Spain strengthened its austerity efforts, 
which further limited the policy options available to address the economic situation. 
Nevertheless, towards the end of the period the Spanish economy started to show some 
signs of stabilisation and recovery that pointed to the possible initiation of a cyclical 
change.  
 
 Labour market and flexicurity performance: 
 
The economic deceleration and macroeconomic readjustment experienced in Spain 
during the period 2012-2014 continued to have a high impact on its labour market. 
Indeed, this period was again characterised by high levels of job destruction and a high 
unemployment rate, especially among young people, unskilled workers, temporary 
employees and old workers. This was caused by the profound domestic economic 
downturn, but it was also the result of the characteristics of the Spanish labour market: 
strong labour market segmentation, employment inflexibility and high labour costs. 
When it comes to flexicurity, it must be noted that as a result of the 2012 labour market 
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reform Spain gained in employment flexibility, especially in terms of dismissal 
protection, collective bargaining, wage-setting systems and internal flexibility options 
for companies
98
. Nevertheless, Spain continued to be slightly below the OECD average 
in the main flexibility indicators
99
.  
 
On the other hand, employment security in the Spanish labour market continued 
decreasing during this period. This was especially the case when it comes to 
investments in active labour market policies and life-long learning strategies, elements 
in which Spain was now below the average of OECD countries
100
. With regards to 
income support during unemployment, and although Spain continued to present a 
generous provision of unemployment benefits
101
, the increasing number of long-term 
unemployed who had exhausted their unemployment benefits and the rising number of 
people exposed to the risks associated with unemployment and employment transitions 
made these levels of investment insufficient to ensure employment security in the 
Spanish labour market. 
 
 Policy program: 
 
With regards to the employment policy followed by Spain during this period, it must be 
noted that the recently elected economically-liberal government adopted a predominant 
market-making approach focused on the attainment of a more flexible, competitive and 
productive labour market
102
. For that purpose, the new Spanish government based its 
employment strategy in the adoption of a structural reform that would enhance the 
internal and external flexibility of the labour market. The main measures included in the 
2012 labour market reform focused on the clarification and easing of the objective 
grounds for dismissal, the reduction of dismissal costs, the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining to the firm level, the moderation of wages and its linkage to productivity and 
company performance, the non-application of collective agreements for companies 
undergoing difficulties, and other measures that allowed for a greater internal flexibility 
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for companies in terms of working times, functional and geographic mobility. The 2012 
labour market reform was accompanied with a subsidiary reform of active labour 
market policies that included a number of predominantly market-correcting measures 
aimed at enhancing employment security. These measures were intended to increase the 
efficacy and efficiency of job search services, promote employment and employability 
through improved training systems, rationalise active labour market policies by focusing 
on young people and permanent hiring, and establish stronger links between active and 
passive employment policies.  
 
 Expectations: 
 
Bearing in mind the previous economic and policy context, it can be expected that a 
balanced approach in European Commission’s policy recommendations to Spain during 
the period 2012-2014 would present a combination of market-correcting and market-
correcting recommendations, although with a greater emphasis on market-correcting 
measures aimed at restoring employment security. Indeed, the high levels of job 
destruction, together with the strong deterioration of the Spanish public finances and the 
austerity measures adopted by the Spanish government, would limit the possibilities of 
developing market-correcting policies. In this sense, and taking into account the 
relatively low levels of employment flexibility in Spain at the beginning of the period, 
European Commission’s policy recommendations during this period are expected to 
support the Spanish government’s market-making efforts as a way to avoid a further 
destruction of employment and create jobs.  
 
Nevertheless, the high levels of unemployment and the considerable deterioration of 
employment security in the Spanish labour market would make it indispensable to 
maintain strong market-correcting efforts. This is even more the case due to the 
predominant market-making orientation of the government’s reform programme during 
this period, which primarily aims to increase flexibility and only pays secondary 
attention to employment security and market-correcting measures. Therefore, a 
balanced approach in European Commission’s policy would be expected to make a big 
emphasis on the need of strengthening market-correcting and employment security-
related measures, especially in terms of active labour market policies, protection from 
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dismissal, the re-training of workers and the adequate provision of unemployment 
benefits. 
 
2) Analysis of Country Specific Recommendations 
 
 2012 Country Specific Recommendations 
 
European Commission’s policy recommendations on Spain’s 2012 national reform 
programme focused on four points. First, European Commission’s policy 
recommendations focused on the structural reform of the Spanish labour market, 
recommending Spain to effectively implement the measures observed in its 2012 labour 
market reform
103
. As noted above, the 2012 Spanish labour market reform presented a 
notable market-making orientation and was intended to enable the free functioning of 
market mechanisms as a way to avoid a further destruction of jobs and create 
employment. As such, and taking into account that the introduction of flexible labour 
arrangements is one of the recommendations included in the 2010-2014 guidelines for 
the employment policies of the Member States
104
, it can be concluded that this 
recommendation presents a market-making orientation, as it is intended to ensure the 
effective implementation of the previously mentioned type of policies. 
 
The second point of attention in European Commission’s policy recommendations 
concerns active labour market policies. More specifically, the European Commission 
recommended Spain to effectively implement the 2012 reform of its active labour 
market policies and to take a number of additional measures intended to increase the 
effectiveness of these policies
105
. As noted above, Spain’s 2012 reform of active labour 
market policies was based on a number of predominantly market-correcting measures 
intended to improve active labour market policies and public employment services as a 
way to address some of the deficiencies of the Spanish labour market, especially to 
reduce the high levels of unemployment. As such, it can be said that a recommendation 
to ensure the effective implementation of this reform presents a market-correcting 
orientation. The same can be said about the additional measures recommended to Spain, 
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as they are all intended to increase the effectiveness of its active labour market policies 
in correcting labour market deficiencies. 
 
In the third place, European Commission’s policy recommendations focused on one of 
the social groups most affected by unemployment in Spain: young people. In particular, 
the European Commission recommended Spain to ‘review spending priorities and 
reallocate funds to support [...] the young people’106. This is a quite broad and vague 
recommendation, as it does not identify specific measures to attain this goal. 
Nevertheless, its focus on a disadvantaged group and its reference to spending and 
funds makes it possible to conclude that this is a market-correcting recommendation 
intended to correct a negative labour-market outcome: the high impact of 
unemployment rates among young people in the Spanish labour market.  
 
Finally, European Commission’s policy recommendations paid attention to the 
enhancement of human capital and the acquisition of relevant labour-market 
competences. For that purpose, European Commission’s policy recommendations 
focused on the need of improving and increasing the quality and labour-market 
relevance of the education, vocational education and professional training, as well as on 
reducing early school-leaving
107
. This recommendation falls within the flexicurity 
component of comprehensive life-long learning strategies, and it is aimed at enhancing 
the employability of future workers. As such, it can be concluded that this 
recommendation presents a market-correcting orientation intended to correct one of the 
main flaws of the Spanish labour market: structural unemployment resulting from the 
lack of relevant professional skills and the mismatch between skills and labour market 
needs. 
 
 2013 Country Specific Recommendations 
 
In 2013, European Commission’s policy recommendations covered four flexicurity-
related elements. First, European Commission’s policy recommendations focused on the 
2012 structural reform of the Spanish labour market. More specifically, the Commission 
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recommended Spain to finalise the ongoing evaluation of the implementation of this 
reform against the background of its objectives, with the aim of presenting the 
necessary amendments to attain those objectives
108
. As noted before, the main goal of 
the 2012 Spanish labour market reform was the deregulation of a number of labour 
market institutions in order to enable the free functioning of market mechanisms as a 
way to avoid a further destruction of jobs and create employment. As such, it can be 
said that a recommendation to evaluate the implementation of this reform and to adopt 
the necessary amendments to attain its objectives presents a clear market-making 
orientation. 
 
The second point of attention in European Commission’s 2013 policy recommendations 
refers to Spain’s active labour market policies. In this case, the European Commission 
recommended Spain to adopt a new Employment Plan for 2013 and to enact a number 
of measures in order to reform its active labour market policies
109
. In both cases, the 
European Commission refers to measures intended to introduce improvements and 
increase the effectiveness of Spain’s active labour market policies with the aim of 
correcting some of the main flaws of the Spanish labour market: the high rate of 
unemployment and the need to attract people to employment. As such, it can be said 
that this is a market-correcting recommendation, as it calls not for market mechanisms 
but for greater state engagement to correct the flaws of the Spanish labour market. 
 
The third flexicurity-related element covered by European Commission’s policy 
recommendations is that of life-long learning strategies. In this regard, the European 
Commission issued two recommendations. First, the European Commission focused on 
re-skilling training programmes for older and low-skilled workers, recommending Spain 
to reinforce their effectiveness
110
. Secondly, the European Commission identified a 
number of measures intended to improve education and training systems, increase their 
labour market relevance and retain students in education
111
. In both cases, the logic 
behind these recommendations is to enhance human capital, increase the employability 
of future workers and avoid potential structural unemployment caused by the lack of 
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relevant professional skills or the mismatch between skills and labour market needs. 
This, together with their focus on disadvantaged social groups (older people, low-skilled 
workers and young people) reveals the market-correcting orientation of these policy 
recommendations, which are aimed at increasing public engagement to correct some of 
the main flaws of the Spanish labour market.  
 
The last flexicurity-related element included in European Commission’s 2013 policy 
recommendations concerns young people and the need to reduce the high 
unemployment rate in this social group. For that purpose, the European Commission 
recommended Spain to ‘implement and monitor closely the effectiveness of the 
measures to fight youth unemployment set out in the Youth Entrepreneurship and 
Employment Strategy 2013-2016’112. The measures identified by the European 
Commission to attain this goal refer to different kinds of active labour market policies 
and life-long learning strategies especially focused on young people. In general terms, 
these measures call for a greater and improved public engagement in order to address 
one of the main deficiencies of the Spanish labour market, namely the high impact of 
unemployment among young people. Consequently, it is possible to conclude that this is 
a policy recommendation with a market-correcting orientation.  
 
 2014 Country Specific Recommendations 
 
In 2014, European Commission’s policy recommendations covered five flexicurity-
related elements. First, European Commission’s policy recommendations focused on 
labour market duality, and recommended Spain to ‘reduce labour market segmentation, 
[...] including through reducing the number of contract types and ensuring a balanced 
access to severance rights’113. This is not a straightforward recommendation, as the 
measures identified to attain the goal of reducing labour market segmentation are quite 
vague and can be oriented in different ways. Nevertheless, the examination of the 2010-
2014 guidelines for the employment policies of Member States shows that, when talking 
about labour market segmentation, the Council tends to make emphasis on market-
making policies based on the promotion of flexible employment legislation and 
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adaptable forms of work organisation
114
. In consequence, it can be said that the goal 
pursued by the European Commission in this recommendation is to reduce labour 
market segmentation by increasing employment flexibility for all different contract 
types. It is clear then that this is a market-making oriented recommendation.  
 
The second point of attention of European Commission’s 2014 policy recommendations 
concerns the structural reform of the Spanish labour market. In this regard, the 
European Commission issued two recommendations. First, the Commission 
recommended Spain to ‘continue the regular monitoring of the labour market reforms’ 
in order to ensure its effective implementation and the attainment of its objectives
115
. As 
noted before, the main goal of the 2012 labour market reform was the deregulation of a 
number of labour market institutions in order to enable the free functioning of market 
mechanisms, avoid a further destruction of jobs and create employment. As such, it can 
be concluded that this recommendation presents a market-making orientation. Secondly, 
the European Commission recommended Spain to ‘promote real wage developments 
consistent with the objective of creating jobs’116. Although it is quite vague, its 
reference to ‘real’ wage developments reveals that the idea behind this recommendation 
is to link wage growth to productivity developments, local conditions and firm level 
circumstances. As such, the objective of this recommendation would be to eliminate 
these barriers that impede wage flexibility and prevent companies from adjusting to 
changing market conditions. Therefore, this recommendation presents a clear market-
making orientation advocating for the free functioning of market mechanisms.  
 
In the third place, European Commission’s 2014 policy recommendations focused on 
active labour market policies. On this point, the European Commission issued two 
recommendations. First, the European Commission recommended Spain to take strong 
action with the aim of improving the general quality and effectiveness of public 
employment services and active labour market policies, paying special attention to those 
social groups in need of special support in accessing employment
117
. The European 
Commission then issued a second recommendation to improve active labour market 
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policies specifically targeting young people
118
. In both cases, the European Commission 
refers to measures intended to introduce improvements and increase the effectiveness of 
Spain’s active labour market policies with the aim of correcting one of the main flaws 
of the Spanish labour market: the high rate of unemployment in the Spanish labour 
market and its high impact on certain social groups, especially young people. As such, it 
can be said that this is a market-correcting recommendation. 
 
Finally, European Commission’s 2014 policy recommendations refer to the need of 
enhancing human capital and promoting the acquisition of relevant labour market 
competences. More specifically, the European Commission recommended Spain to 
effectively implement the measures envisaged to reduce early-school leaving, take 
additional action to increase the quality and labour-market relevance of the educational 
and professional training systems, and adopt the necessary measures to ensure the 
adequate re-training of unemployed people
119
. This recommendation, that falls within 
the flexicurity component of comprehensive life-long learning strategies, is aimed at 
enhancing the employability of future workers and active people. As such, it can be 
concluded that this recommendation presents a market-correcting orientation intended 
to correct one of the main flaws of the Spanish labour market: the lack of relevant 
professional skills and the mismatch between skills and labour market needs. 
 
3) Conclusion 
 
The previous analysis shows that, out of the 15 flexicurity-related CSRs issued to Spain 
in the period 2012-2014, 5 presented a market-making orientation and 10 pursued 
market-correcting aims. This reveals a policy approach based on a combination of both, 
market-correcting and market-making policy recommendations, although with a greater 
emphasis on market-correcting measures. The contextualisation of this analysis shows 
that this policy approach takes place against the background of a profound economic 
deceleration with high levels of job destruction, relatively low levels of employment 
flexibility and a serious deterioration of public finances. This helps to explain the 
identification by the European Commission of market-making policy recommendations 
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aimed at supporting Spanish government’s efforts to increase the flexibility and enable 
the free functioning of the Spanish labour market.  
 
Nevertheless, these policy recommendations also take place against the background of a 
high unemployment rate, a serious deterioration of employment security for Spanish 
workers and the predominantly market-making oriented policy program designed by the 
Spanish government in this period. This allows to understand the greater emphasis made 
by the European Commission on market-correcting policy recommendations aimed at 
restoring employment security in the Spanish labour market. However, and even if 
European Commission’s recommendations in this period include a number of market-
correcting measures, the serious deterioration of employment security levels would have 
required more far-reaching market-correcting measures, especially in terms of 
protection from dismissal. In any case, and bearing in mind the expectations raised for 
this period, it can be concluded that flexicurity-related CSRs issued to Spain during the 
years 2005-2007 present a relatively balanced ideological orientation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has aimed to contribute to the debate on the existence of a neoliberal bias in 
the process of European integration by addressing some under-researched elements and 
bringing new evidence to this debate. For that purpose, this thesis has conducted a 
qualitative and contextualised in-depth study of the process of implementation of 
European economic governance, with a special focus on the role played by the 
European Commission in this process. The implementation of EU policies within the 
framework of European economic governance is based on a complex process through 
which abstract policy goals are translated into specific policy measures. Due to the 
coordination nature of the process, the implementation of these EU policies also 
requires the adaptation of common EU goals to specific national contexts. As a result, a 
process that was supposed to be merely technical has become a rather political task, and 
one that can have a considerable influence on the final ideological orientation of these 
policies.  
 
49 
 
The importance of the political nature of the process of implementation is the 
considerable room for discretion that it offers to the actors involved in it. In this sense, it 
is necessary to consider the key role played by the European Commission in managing 
the process of implementation of European economic governance through the issuing of 
country-specific recommendations. These highly political and almost enforceable 
instruments are key elements through which the European Commission can steer policy 
implementation, as the European Commission enjoys considerable discretion to decide 
which elements it makes more emphasis on in its policy recommendations. Therefore, 
the analysis of country-specific recommendations appears as the most suitable option to 
examine the existence of a possible neoliberal bias in the implementation of European 
economic governance by the European Commission. 
 
In order to allow for a qualitative and contextualised in-depth analysis, this thesis has 
conducted a single case study that focuses on flexicurity-related CSRs issued to Spain 
during the period 2005-2014. By means of this analysis, this thesis has aimed to answer 
the following research question: to what extent has the European Commission displayed 
a preference towards neoliberal policies in the Country Specific Recommendations 
issued to Spain in the area of employment policy during the years 2005-2014? The goal 
was to find patterns in the ideological orientation and combination of flexicurity-related 
CSRs issued by the European Commission that could reveal the existence of a 
neoliberal bias in the implementation of this EU policy.  
 
The analysis conducted in this thesis shows that, out of the 40 flexicurity-related CSRs 
issued to Spain in the period 2005-2014, 14 presented a market-making orientation and 
24 pursued market-correcting aims, while other 2 were too broadly defined as to be 
possible to classify them into one of these two categories. In principle, this would point 
to a predominant market-correcting orientation in European Commission’s policy 
recommendations, and would deny the existence of a neoliberal bias in the 
implementation of European economic governance. Nevertheless, the qualitative 
content analysis of these policy recommendations shows that European Commission’s 
market-making recommendations are many times more far-reaching than market-
correcting ones, which are rather conceived as supporting measures complementing the 
market-making structural reform of the Spanish labour market. This attenuates the 
quantitative predominance of policy recommendations with a market-correcting 
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orientation and reveals a more balanced approach in European Commission’s 
recommendations.  
 
As for the contextualisation of the analysis conducted in this thesis, the examination of 
flexicurity-related CSRs issued to Spain during 2005-2014 reveals that the European 
Commission tends to adapt its policy recommendations to the limitations and 
opportunities offered by the national economic context. However, this analysis shows 
that European Commission’s policy recommendations are less balanced when it comes 
to the flexicurity performance of the specific member state. In the Spanish case, which 
presents a poor performance in terms of both labour-market flexibility and employment 
security, European Commission’s policy recommendations have identified far-reaching 
market-making measures aimed at enhancing flexibility in the Spanish labour market, 
whereas sometimes it would have been necessary for the European Commission to 
make a greater emphasis on substantial market-correcting measures aimed at enhancing 
employment security. With regards to their adaptation to the policy programme 
followed by the national government, the analysis conducted in this thesis shows that 
European Commission’s policy recommendations present a relatively balanced 
approach.  
 
All in all, the findings of the analysis conducted in this thesis make it possible to say 
that European Commission’s policy recommendations present a relatively balanced 
approach, although sometimes they are slightly biased towards market-making 
solutions. However, this is not true for all the sub-periods analysed, and in any case this 
finding is not solid enough as to be able to talk about a clear neoliberal bias in the 
implementation of European economic governance. In addition, it must be taken into 
account that country-specific recommendations tend to be short policy messages which 
are also often quite vague. This makes it difficult to conduct an objective interpretation 
and therefore to present solid conclusions about the ideological orientation of these 
policy recommendations. The same can be said about the complexity of evaluating the 
national contexts to which CSRs are supposed to adapt. For these reasons, further 
research should conduct more qualitative and contextualised analyses on the ideological 
orientation of European Commission’s policy recommendations issued to other member 
states and in other policy areas. This would allow this debate to collect more conclusive 
evidence on the existence of a neoliberal bias in the process of European integration.   
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